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Abstract 
The Information Packaging Hypothesis (Alibali, Kita & Young, 2000) holds that gestures play a 
role in organizing information into conceptual “packages” to be verbalized by the speaker.  
Representational gestures may be specific for strengthening conceptual representations in 
working memory.  This embodied spatial content may facilitate verbal explanations of both 
physical and more abstract problems.  Experiment 1 was designed to analyze transfer of 
format-specific gestures. Participants solved the Tower of Hanoi problem in a physical or 
computerized version and then explained the solution of the same or opposite format. 
Representational gestures were format-specific in the same conditions but did not show 
dominance of experienced gestures in transferring to opposite formats.  In Experiment 2, 
participants first performed the standard Tower of Hanoi problem and then explained an 
analogous Russian Dolls problem while gesture was allowed or precluded.  The problem was 
congruent (direct mapping) or incongruent (inverse size mapping of tower pieces and dolls).  In 
this case, representational gestures did carry over to the analog, but with adaptations. Under 
congruent mapping, they were modified to “doll-appropriate” holding formations, whereas 
under incongruent mapping speakers adhered to disc-appropriate grasping gestures.  Gesture 
prohibition impeded fluency in explanations of the Russian Dolls problem.  Representational 
gestures are therefore not only imagistic, but are linked to underlying structures for conveying 
conceptual material.   More broadly, explanation of analogs is a fruitful setting for exploring the 
cognitive utility of representational gestures. 
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Representational Gestures Reflect Conceptualization in Problem Solving 
Though they are widely observed, some of the gestures we produce may be mere 
handwaving or floundering to indicate speakers’ frustrations with producing words.  This would 
render gesture production an automatic but gratuitous behavior that we do not consciously 
suppress when it is unnecessary.  Conversely, we may produce some gestures when they are 
not necessary for listener comprehension because they provide cognitive utility for the speaker.   
 
Representational gestures are defined by Chu and Kita (2008) as iconic gestures in which 
the hands represent placement or movement of an object.  These specific gestures may not 
necessarily be floundering to indicate dysfluency, but actually a means to prevent it in the 
speaker by providing access to appropriate mental imagery before the onset of speech.   Under 
this view, representational gestures may serve as an aid for the speaker in alleviating 
production difficulties.  General models of the language production system (e.g., Levelt, 1989) 
Fig. 1:  General model of language production 
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support the idea that non-linguistic ideas are first conceptualized before they are structured as 
well-formed sentences.   A critical question, then, is whether gesture supports conceptualizing 
the message or formulating the sentence.  If moments of conceptual dysfluency reflect demand 
on a speaker’s production system, gestures may help speakers alleviate them by providing a 
format for remembering more visuospatial details (Goldin-Meadow, Nusbaum, Kelly & Wagner, 
2001).   This possibility is consistent with the idea that that representational gesture supports 
the organization of conceptual material for later verbalization (see Fig. 1). 
We often find our hands moving when we are providing narrations (McNeill, 1992) or 
explaining how we discovered a solution to a problem (Wagner, Nusbaum, and Goldin-
Meadow, 2004).  These tasks are quite complex.  The mind must take a concept or event and 
break it up into segments that flow together logically.  We spatialize events in time and 
verbalize them in order to make them accessible to others.  However, the English language has 
a relatively limited spatial vocabulary, so it is somewhat limited in terms of describing objects in 
space or indicating directional information (Wagner et al., 2004).  Pausing or slowing down 
speech may occur when a speaker needs to consider the best way to structure statements 
which convey directional information.   Furthermore, by enhancing the ability to conceptualize 
this non-linguistic information, gesture may alleviate dysfluencies in explaining a problem’s 
solution to somebody else.   
By focusing on gesture’s role in problem solving, we can address the limits of speech in 
problem solving, as well as whether speakers compensate for these limits by using gesture to 
build conceptual representations for speech.   Previous research has specifically focused on 
gesture in the case of explaining how to solve the Tower of Hanoi (Wagner & Goldin-Meadow, 
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2004; Wagner Cook & Tanenhaus, 2009).  The Tower of Hanoi is a puzzle consisting of three or 
more graduated discs to be moved from a source peg to a goal peg (e.g., Hayes & Simon, 1977).  
The discs must be moved according to two rules.  The first rule states that only one disc can be 
moved at a time; the second rule limits the solver from placing a larger disc on top of a smaller 
one.  Many conceptual features of explaining the steps of this sequential puzzle seem to 
support representational gesture production.  However, the Tower of Hanoi can also be 
represented in a diverse range of analogs, all which differ in their respective problem spaces.  
Solving analogies requires a transfer of relational knowledge from a source problem to a target 
by finding correspondences between the two analogs (e.g., Yaner & Goel, 2006).  Thus, 
representational gesture processes used in explaining how to solve the Tower of Hanoi may be 
critically necessary in the case of analogical problem solving.  Building conceptual 
representations is a critical element of solving these problems, for the solver must store in 
memory the structure of the source analog.  By doing this, it becomes easier to track the 
analogical mapping between two problems, especially if the source analog can be represented 
in the mind as a concrete image.  The solver can “map” the properties of the target analog to 
the source analog in order to more easily visualize critical aspects of the target analog’s 
problem space.  The target problem’s steps are now much easier to picture in this “mental 
map” following transfer between the two formats.  However non-linguistic, spatial mental 
representations of solution-relevant details are difficult to conceptualize for speaking.  Given 
the limited number of words for spatial references in English, speakers may find it desirable to 
move their hands to “visualize” the concepts that are to be verbalized. 
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Gesture may be critical for conceptualizing this non-linguistic information to eventually 
be placed in speech.  Specifically, representational gestures may be a reflection of how solvers 
conceptualize particular problems (Chu & Kita, 2008).  In the present study, I will address 
whether representational gestures help capture solution-relevant details and carry forward to 
different problem formats.  I will evaluate whether speakers produce gestures that reflect 
thinking in a particular problem format, whether there is transfer of format-specific gestures, 
and why speakers might prefer to gesture in one format over another.  Furthermore, I will 
evaluate whether format-specific gestures carry forward to facilitate explanations of novel 
problems, and what these gestures say about how we conceptualize easy versus difficult 
information.  If these format-specific representational gestures are associated with 
conceptualizing difficult material, then they may provide cognitive utility for speakers. 
Embodiment of Spatial Content  
Rauscher et al. (1996) showed that levels of gesture tend to increase when the content 
of speech is spatial.  In their study, speakers were prohibited from gesturing when describing a 
cartoon and were required to use as many uncommon words as possible or to avoid using 
words that contained a specified letter.  This was done to specifically increase dysfluencies and 
induce speech that would not normally be found in the speaker’s usual register.  Their results 
suggested that gestures derived from spatially encoded knowledge facilitate lexical retrieval 
during grammatical encoding, but only for speech terms that indicated directional information.   
When gesturing was prevented, participants’ ability to describe spatial content was slowed 
down, but non-spatial descriptions (for example those including idioms “the coyote ended up 
hoisted by his own petard”) were not affected.  Here, gesture may have served as a tool to 
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embody spatial content.  Preventing gesture may have interfered with access to information in 
visuospatial memory.  This Lexical Retrieval Hypothesis states that the role of gesture is to help 
generate the surface forms of utterances when speech production is restrained by a limited 
spatial vocabulary. 
Conversely, Alibali et al. (2000) found gesture’s utility to be conceptual.  In their study, 
children who were placed in situations of constrained thinking, such as in a Piagetian 
conservation task, gestured more than in a purely descriptive task.  Because verbal responses 
were comparable across tasks that differed in their degrees of information packaging, then the 
gestures may have played a role in organizing that information.  This Information Packaging 
Hypothesis posits that gestures have cognitive utility for placing specific conceptual information 
into “packages” that help structure the elicited speech, supporting evidence from McNeill 
(1992) that gesture plays a role in thinking for speaking by enhancing conceptualization of non-
linguistic material.  This form of conceptualization allows speakers to organize a string of 
concepts into mental representations, which are further broken down into verbalizable units 
(Kita, 2000).  Furthermore, gesture may also influence mental representations of sequential 
tasks by focusing speakers’ attention on particular features of their situations (Alibali & 
DiRusso, 1999).  Under this hypothesis, prohibiting gesture leads to difficulties conceptualizing 
speech.  Thus, when speakers cannot gesture, they may take time to look for different ways to 
package that information, increasing their number of speech dysfluencies (Alibali et al., 2000). 
Conveying Procedural Knowledge 
Gesture may be especially useful in instances of communicating information about task 
execution, where the knowledge to be conveyed is procedural.  According to Willingham, 
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Nissen, & Bullemer (1989), procedural knowledge is not always linguistically accessible.   This 
may be due to the conceptual demands associated with breaking down a task into discrete 
steps that follow logically to achieve a particular goal.  Furthermore, this process is especially 
difficult in attempting to convey that knowledge after the task has been performed, when 
visual cues have been removed.  A question then, is whether “action” information is encoded in 
gesture when procedural knowledge is conveyed to others, especially when this information 
embodies spatial content.  Space and action descriptions are known to elicit iconic gestures 
(McNeill, 1992; Rogers, 1978, 1979) which may play a role in conveying how solvers reach the 
end state of a sequential problem.  
Lozano and Tversky (2006) found that limiting speech not only increased the number of 
gestures needed to convey procedural knowledge, but showed which gestures were most 
critical for achieving the goal of assembling a piece of furniture.  In particular, when speakers 
were prohibited from speaking, representational gestures that demonstrated how and where 
to properly place the furniture parts were selectively used over deictic gestures such as finger 
points or mere indications.  These iconic gestures carried semantic content which represented 
attributes, movement, and relationships between objects in the steps of the sequence.  
Participants whose speech was constrained showed a selective increase for these iconic 
gestures to provide as complete a picture of the procedure as possible.  From these findings, 
we can conclude that speaking best conveys descriptive information about how a problem 
space is represented in the mind, but gesture which models action is selectively chosen for 
demonstrating actions when speech is not sufficient for creating a mental image in the mind of 
a listener.  Therefore, representational gestures which demonstrate actions may provide us 
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insight for understanding how we represent and conceptualize solution-relevant details of 
particular problems. 
Reflections of Conceptualization 
Evidence for the Information Packaging Hypothesis is observed in Wagner Cook and 
Tanenhaus’s (2009) study involving solving the Tower of Hanoi.  These researchers found that 
explaining how to solve a physical version of Tower of Hanoi elicits different representational 
gestures than when explaining how to solve a computer version.  The representational gestures 
in explaining the physical version took the handshape form of grasping the discs with the thumb 
and forefinger as opposed to the flatter handshape which resembles holding a mouse. Although 
the speech patterns were similar across both explanations, those who solved the problem using 
real objects reproduced features of those actions in their gestures more than those who solved 
the problem by moving those objects with a mouse on a computer screen.  The gestures that 
accompanied the subsequent explanations of how to solve the problem reflected procedural 
knowledge of the task, where certain concepts can be expressed in the hands as well as 
through speech.  These gestures represented strategies derived from concrete visuospatial 
concepts.  Because verbal responses were similar across the tasks that differ in the type of 
information encoded (for example, differences between physical and computer versions), 
gesture may play a role in organizing that information conceptually. 
Wagner Cook, Mitchell, and Goldin-Meadow (2008) also addressed gesture’s role for 
directly encoding visuospatial information by manipulating children’s gestures when learning 
abstract mathematical concepts.   Children who were permitted to gesture while learning the 
mathematical concepts retained that knowledge better than children who were only allowed to 
Representational gestures  10 
 
speak.  These findings suggest that gestures serve as a way to spatially represent new, abstract 
ideas in visuospatial memory, especially in situations of quantitative reasoning.  Expressing 
information in gesture and speech, instead of speech alone, might produce robust memory 
representations as a result of strong, concrete motor movements—a form of using the hands to 
train the mind.  These movements encoded procedural concepts that may have been retrieved 
at a later time, especially for the task of conveying action information to others.   
More specifically, kinesthetic movements might focus a speaker’s attention on selecting 
pieces and how they relate to produce complex sequences.  A speaker can use representational 
gestures, or movements of their hands and arms that depict the image they are describing 
(McNeill, 1992) for the purpose of conceptualizing a complicated spatial image into units for 
speaking.  These were precisely the findings of Hostetter, Alibali, and Kita (2007).  If 
representational gestures are indicative of underlying mental representations, then speakers 
should gesture more when conceptualizing more difficult information.  In the Hostetter et al. 
(2007) study, when speakers described ambiguous pictures of dots that were scattered 
(abstract), higher gestural levels emerged than when they described dots connected by 
concrete, geometric shapes.  Representational gestures seemed to indicate speakers’ attempts 
to make their mental representations a bit more concrete before placing them into speech.  
This evidence supports the claim that representational gestures should occur more often when 
spatial information needs to be organized.  This type of conceptual demand differs considerably 
from that which involves integrating a series of logical steps to describe spatial information.  
Since the spoken spatial information is more ambiguous, the speaker must do more to chunk it 
into appropriate units, and would be more likely to use gesture as a strategy to organize such 
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information.  This type of strategy may be especially helpful in cases of conceptualizing novel 
analogs. 
Analogical Transfer 
Analogical reasoning involves a transfer of relational knowledge from a source problem 
to a target problem by finding appropriate correspondences between the two problem spaces.  
This process involves transferring the relational structure from the source to the target, then 
correspond it to the target.  To adapt the solution of the source to the target, the problem 
solver must store in memory the source of the structure (Yaner and Goel, 2006).  This process 
involves mapping aspects of visual and conceptual information to target analogs.  When a 
person selects the relevant information, that visuospatial information is matched with that of 
the target.  When both problems share common structural attributes, it is more likely that the 
solver will be able to move back and forth between them.  However, when common objects 
share only functional relations but differ in object attributes, mapping between the two tasks 
becomes much more difficult (Chen, Mo, and Honomichl, 2004).  An example of this would be 
the Tower of Hanoi problem and its analogic Tea Ceremony problem:   
In the inns of certain Himalayan villages is practiced a refined tea 
ceremony.  The ceremony involves a host and exactly two guests, neither 
more nor less.  When his guests have arrived and seated themselves at 
his table, the host performs three services for them.  These services are 
listed in the order of the nobility the Himalayans attribute to them:  
stoking the fire, fanning the flames, and pouring the tea.  During the 
ceremony, any of those present may ask, “Honored Sir, may I perform 
this onerous task for you?”  However, a person may request of another 
only the least noble of the tasks which the other is performing.  
Furthermore, if a person is performing any tasks, then he may not 
request a task that is nobler than the least noble task he is already 
performing.  Custom requires that by the time the tea ceremony is over, 
all the tasks will have been transferred from the host to the most senior 
of the guests.  How can this be accomplished? 
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Rather than thinking about the problem in terms of transferring objects, the solver must 
refer to the Tower of Hanoi “disc sizes” abstractly as “least noble” and “most noble.”  
Additionally, the solver must refer to leftmost and rightmost pegs as “least senior” and “most 
senior.”  Thus, the step “move the smallest disc to the rightmost peg” becomes “have the most 
senior guest do the least noble task.” In this particular situation, the goal is to have all of the 
tasks shift from the least noble to the most noble of the guests.  The host is analogous to the 
leftmost Tower of Hanoi peg, while the most senior guest is analogous to the rightmost peg.  
The least noble task of “fanning the flames” is analogous to the smallest disc while “pouring the 
tea” is analogous to the largest disc.  Therefore, explaining this problem’s solution is a matter of 
stating that the most senior guest must first do the least noble task, the second most senior 
guest do the second most noble task, and so on.  However, the underlying mental 
representation of the concrete Tower of Hanoi makes it easier for the solver to visualize which 
guest does which task at exactly the right moment in the sequence.  It would be very difficult to 
solve this conceptual problem and keep track of the steps of the solution without a spatial, 
mental representation encoded from the original Tower of Hanoi. Therefore, the underlying 
mental representations of both the Tower of Hanoi and the Tea ceremony are spatial, despite 
the fact that they describe a different set of verbalized action sequences (speaking in spatial 
terms versus non-spatial speech). 
Previous research has examined many of the gestural effects when explaining how to 
solve a spatial problem like the Tower of Hanoi; however, it has not yet been determined 
whether there are transfers of gesture across different problem formats.  Furthermore, this 
research has not yet determined whether experience with the same sensorimotor information 
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is critical for facilitating the conceptualization of novel problems.  Gestural representations of 
one problem could also be useful when working with more abstract representations of the 
same task goal.  All of the analogs of the Tower of Hanoi contain similar respective problem 
spaces, but these might not be very obvious to the solver, depending on how they are stated.  
Still, thinking about the Chinese Tea Ceremony analog brings to mind many of the similar 
conceptual representations of the Tower of Hanoi.  Regardless, the problem is highly verbal and 
does not explicitly state the same amount of spatial information.   
Representational gestures may facilitate analogic problem solving by having an impact 
on working memory.  Specifically, they may play a role in illuminating and retrieving mental 
representations of the source analog to be transferred to the target.  Wagner et al. (2004) 
found that gesturing facilitates recall of visuospatial details.  For this to be true, 
representational gestures must also be linked to processes for conveying conceptual material.  
If conceptual information underlies gestures associated with describing information in 
visuospatial memory, those gestures might also be beneficial for solving analogous problems 
containing more conceptual information.  In other words, when the mental representations 
underlying speech are spatial in nature, gesture may act on those visuospatial details in order to 
help the solver parse the sequence of actions as he or she explains how to solve an analog. 
Transfer of Representational Gestures 
So far, we have seen a good deal of supporting evidence for the production of 
representational gestures in the conceptual phase of speech planning.  Furthermore, these 
representational gestures seem to be a reflection of how problem solvers work in particular 
problem spaces (Wagner Cook & Tanenhaus, 2009).  The present study sought to extend 
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existing research by not only noting how representational gestures reflect specific problem 
spaces, but whether features of them transfer to different formats.  Experiment 1 was designed 
to determine whether embodied gesture effects transfer across situations with formats of 
differing concreteness.  This experiment extended the findings of Wagner Cook & Tanenhaus 
(2009) by comparing gestures in solving two different versions of the Tower of Hanoi.  In a 
physical version of the task, solvers manipulated concrete discs of the puzzle with their hands, 
while the computer version involved clicking and dragging the discs on a screen with a mouse.  I 
examined whether the effects of being in either the physical or computer versions would 
transfer across changing situations (i.e., whether the gestures from the physical experience 
transfer when explaining the computer version and vice versa).  For participants presented with 
a computer version of the task following the physical experience, I predicted that the physical 
action gestures would tend to “carry over” in those explanations, indicating that the speaker 
called on previous gestural experiences to help facilitate the explanation.  On the other hand, if 
a speaker is placed in the physical situation following the computer experience, he or she might 
still produce some grasping gestures without actually having the experience of physically 
manipulating the concrete objects.  I will call this an import effect, where previous general 
knowledge, but not recent concrete experience, is reflected in the approach to the current 
problem.  These transfer and import effects between two very similar formats served as a 
manipulation check to be extended into Experiment 2.  Conceptualizing information in different 
formats should be reflected in the different representational gestures produced by speakers if 
they are speaking about the same thing.  I examined whether the mapping between source 
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action gestures formed from the physical Tower of Hanoi could aid a speaker in explaining how 
to solve an analog.   
Experiment 2 addressed the role of gesture in a situation where conceptual demand is 
raised after transferring to the more verbal format of an analog.  Spatial imagery will still be 
needed for solving a particular analog of the Tower of Hanoi, and I wish to address whether this 
will engage gesture as it does in concrete problems.  If a speaker is given the opportunity to 
gesture when explaining how to solve the analog, the capacity to verbalize information that is 
stored in a visuospatial format may be greater (Goldin-Meadow et al., 2001).   Thus, when 
speaking about the abstract analog, the mental representations strengthened by gesture might 
shift some of the cognitive load from other areas of working memory.  When information is 
more evenly distributed across these modalities, speakers may find it easier to place certain 
information in the hands and certain information through speech.  Such information might be 
reflective of how speakers are conceptualizing in different problem spaces. 
One purpose of Experiment 2 was to expand the study of representational gesture to a 
more abstract situation. Another purpose of the experiment was to test the degree to which 
representational gestures are imagistic and are linked to underlying structures for conveying 
abstract, conceptual material.  I manipulated the mental representations of some of the 
speakers by requiring them to invert the first Tower of Hanoi task in order to be able to solve 
the analog.  This manipulation increased the conceptual demand of the task.  If speakers found 
a benefit in using gesture to handle analogous verbal material that involved spatial inversion, 
then these gestures would provide insight to breaking down the more complex image.   Overall 
load may therefore be decreased and it will be easier for the speaker to give a thorough 
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explanation of how to solve the problem, providing greater insight into the underlying structure 
and curbing speech dysfluencies that would result from decreased ability to organize 
conceptual information. 
 
Experiment 1:  Physical – Computer Transfer 
 Experiment 1 was designed to determine whether the embodied gestures found in Cook 
and Tanenhaus (2009) would transfer to different formats, while also replicating their format-
specific findings.  I was interested in comparing format-specific gestures that may differ when 
comparable speech is used to explain the solution to the Tower of Hanoi.  However, my study 
goes beyond that of Cook and Tanenhaus (2009) because I was also interested in seeing 
whether strong action gestures from one task carried over to explanations of the alternate task 
solution.  Therefore, I presented the alternative version of the recently completed task and 
asked them how to solve this specific version.  If participants gesture differently despite similar 
speech in direct explanations of the physical or computer format, my results will build further 
supporting evidence for the Information Packaging Hypothesis (Alibali et al., 2000).  
Transferring the gestures when describing the alternative task would be a carryover effect, 
reflecting retrieval of gestures from the immediately preceding experience with the physical or 
computer task.    More carryover is predicted in physical-computer transfers, because the 
grasping handshapes seen in the physical format are more specific.  In addition to carryover, I 
predicted an import effect, where the properties of the current task determined the gestures 
used, rendering the previous experience less relevant. 
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Method 
Participants 
  Participants were Lehigh University undergraduates (n = 32) enrolled in an introductory 
psychology course.  They participated to gain direct experience of the research process.  All 
participants reported that they were fluent in English.  None reported recent experience with 
the Tower of Hanoi. 
Materials 
 I used a physical version of the Tower of Hanoi which consisted of three wooden pegs 
and three wooden discs.  Additionally, I used a similar computerized three disc version which 
presented the Tower of Hanoi task clearly to the participants (Wong, n.d.).  Participants solved 
this version of the puzzle on the computer screen. 
Design 
 Participants were placed in one of four conditions:  physical-to-physical, physical-to-
computer, computer-to-computer, and computer-to-physical (see Figure 2).  In the physical 
condition, participants worked with the physical version of the puzzle and then explained its 
solution without any exposure to the computerized version.  In the physical-to-computer 
version, participants worked with the physical version, and watched the experimenter partially 
solve the computerized version before explaining the latter.  In the computer-to-computer 
version, participants worked with only the computerized version and then explained its 
solution.  In the computer-to-physical version, participants solved the computerized version of 
the puzzle but never actually solved the physical puzzle.  Thus, the experiment used a 2 
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Experience format (physical, computer) by 2 Explanation format (physical, computer) between-
groups design. 
Procedure 
 Following consent to be videoed, each 
participant was initially presented with either a 
physical model of the Tower of Hanoi covered by a 
paper bag, or the computer version with the 
monitor turned off.  In every condition the 
experimenter uncovered the model (either by 
removing the bag or turning on the monitor) and 
explained to the participant that he or she would be solving a common puzzle where all three 
discs must be transferred from the first peg on the left, to the third peg on the right.  The 
experimenter provided the two rules:  that only one disc could be moved at a time and that a 
smaller disc could only be placed on top of a larger disc.  To encourage as many participants to 
solve it optimally the first time as possible, the experimenter told the participant that the 
smallest disc must first be moved to the rightmost peg.  Once participants indicated that they 
understood the rules and hint, they proceeded to solve their respective versions of the puzzle.  
 Participants were videotaped as they solved and later explained the puzzle.  If the 
participant did not solve the puzzle in seven steps the first time, the experimenter explained to 
them that it could be solved in fewer steps and had the participant repeat the task until they 
solved it optimally once.  After they solved the puzzle, the experimenter either covered the 
Fig. 2:  Experiment 1 design 
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physical model or turned off the monitor so that neither would visually aid the participant 
during his or her explanation. 
 Participants in the physical-to-physical or computer-to-computer versions went into 
their explanations without being exposed to the other format.   Participants in the physical-to-
computer version, following their experience with the physical model, were exposed to the 
computerized version of the task.  The experimenter brought up the computer version and 
explained that the Tower of Hanoi can also be solved on a computer.  The experimenter briefly 
demonstrated a few moves for the participant but did not actually solve the puzzle.  
Participants in the computer-to-physical condition, following their experience with the 
computerized version, were exposed to the physical model.  The experimenter uncovered the 
physical model and explained that the Tower of Hanoi can also be presented as a physical 
puzzle.  Again, a few moves were demonstrated, but the experimenter did not actually solve 
the puzzle. 
 In every condition, the experimenter asked each participant to imagine that a second 
grader would be learning how to solve this physical or computer version of the puzzle for the 
first time, to think about what that would be like if they were the young child and a complete 
novice to the task.  They were told that they would be explaining how they solved the puzzle for 
the 2nd grader, being very explicit as to which disc they were moving and where they were 
moving it to.  This way, the second grader would be able to follow along as they described each 
step.  Participants, after indicating that they understood the instructions, explained how they 
solved the puzzle to the video camera that was operated by the experimenter.  Following the 
explanation, the camera was turned off and participants were debriefed and thanked. 
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Results 
Coding of Embodied Gestures 
 Two main types of representational gestures occurred alongside speech.  Static 
gestures accompanied speech that indicated a certain size disc (i.e. first you take the smallest 
disc).  Here, the handshape indicated that the participant was about to work with that 
particular disc, but did not yet send the disc in a particular direction.  Static gestures were 
coded as grasping and non-grasping.  Grasping gestures consisted of the thumb and one or 
more fingers closing down around an imaginary disc.  Such gestures appeared to reference the 
physical version of the Tower of Hanoi.  Non-grasping gestures did not consist of these specific 
hand shapes.  Instead, these gestures indicated that the participant was about to select a 
certain disc, but did not physically mimic holding it.  The hand shapes were flatter, less specific, 
and thus appeared to reference manipulating a computer mouse. 
 In addition to seeing how participants would select objects, I was interested in whether 
they would maintain those specific hand shapes when indicating directional information.  
Directional gestures sometimes accompanied speech that described how to move an object to 
a specific location (e.g., …and move it to the rightmost peg).  These gestures sometimes 
maintained static gesture hand shapes, and sometimes did not.  For example, two participants 
might produce similar static grasping gestures, but one might maintain the handshape and one 
might not when indicating directional information.  Directional gestures were therefore coded 
as grasping and non-grasping.  Grasping directional gestures maintained the grasping hand 
shape while simultaneously moving the hand in space; non-grasping directional gestures 
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indicated directional information without grasping, and so appeared to reference moving a 
computer mouse.  
Physical Solving 
 Static and directional gestures were compared across physical and computer explaining 
conditions after solving the physical Tower of Hanoi problem.  Results are presented in Figure 
3a.  Clearly there is no difference in overall gesture levels as a function of the format being 
explained (46 Physical vs. 52 Computer).   However, there is a clear difference in the 
distribution of grasping and non-grasping gestures across conditions, X-square (1) = 12.96, p < 
0.001.  Participants who explained the physical version of the Tower of Hanoi maintained high 
levels of static grasping gestures, but participants who explained the computer version 
produced relatively balanced numbers of grasping and non-grasping gestures.   
     
   Fig. 3a:  Frequencies of static grasping gestures produced by physical solvers 
 Patterns for directional gestures were similar to those of static gestures (Figure 3b).  
Again, participants showed clear preferences for format-specific gestures.  The pattern is not as 
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distinct as for static gestures, but is significant, X-square (1) = 5.61, p < 0.05.  Even when 
describing direction, the incidence of grasps was high among participants who explained the 
physical version while there were more non-grasps among participants who explained the  
computer version.  
  
Fig. 3b:  Frequencies of directional gestures produced by physical solvers. 
Computer Solving 
Turning to the conditions where participants had direct experience with the computer 
version of the problem, the same analyses were preformed. Static and directional gestures 
were again compared across explained conditions.  Results for the static gestures are presented 
in Figure 4a.  Again, overall gesture levels were comparable.  Although the distributional 
pattern resembles that for the physical computer condition, with a preference for grasping 
gestures in the physical explanation condition, this time it is not significantly different than 
chance (X-square (1) = 1.25, p = 0.26, ns).  Unlike after physical experience of the Tower of 
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Hanoi, format-specific gestures were not as strongly evident after solving the computer version 
of the Tower of Hanoi.  
 
 Fig 4a:  frequencies of static gestures produced by computer solvers 
 Interestingly, participants showed different patterns of directional gestures following 
the computer experience (Figure 4b).  Participants in the physical explaining condition 
maintained their grasps, whereas those in the computer explaining condition tended to shift to 
a non-grasping mode, X-square (1) =12.88, p < 0.007.  This outcome suggests that participants 
were “captured by the mouse,” when indicating directional information.  This phenomenon 
may have resulted from format-specific encoding of directional information in order to be able 
to retrieve from memory the steps in solving the puzzle. 
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 Fig. 4b:  Frequencies of directional gestures produced by computer solvers 
 These findings suggest a strong carryover of grasping gestures from physical experience 
to physical explanation, replicating the results reported by Wagner Cook and Tanenhaus (2009).  
Participants also imported grasping gestures in physical explanations following computer 
experience, though this was significant only for directional gestures (22 grasping vs. 9 non-
grasping, X-square (1) = 5.42, p < .05.  However, there is little evidence for grasping gestures 
transferring from physical experience to the computer task. Even in explaining the computer 
version following computer experience, there were as many static grasps (18) as non-grasps 
(17).  However, an interesting shift occurred for directional gestures.  Here, the balance of 
grasping and non-grasping was maintained after physical experience, but shifted substantially 
to non-grasping gestures following computer experience (compare figures 4a and 4b).  This 
pattern is statistically significant (X-square (1) = 8.00, p < .001).  
 The results from the computer solvers provide us with slightly different reasons as to 
why conceptualization may differ as a result of having a less concrete experience.  Static 
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gestures were relatively balanced across all of the explaining conditions, indicating that 
participants’ static codes were not strongly influenced by experience with the computer format.  
However, once participants needed to provide directional information, their gestures became 
very format-specific.  Physical explainers adhered to the preference for imported grasps, 
whereas computer explainers shifted to non-grasping directional gestures.  From this, it 
appears that the static encoding of objects is not very specific following solving a computerized 
version of the puzzle, but that encoding becomes more format-specific as speakers indicate 
directional information in their explanations. 
 Why did computer solvers show format-specific preferences for indicating direction but 
not for indicating objects?  It may be useful to consider this finding from the perspective that 
indicating directional information in English is relatively difficult.  The grasping handshape may 
be preferred for indicating the selection of objects (static codes), but the grasp is irrelevant 
when a shape is dragged by a mouse.  Thus, speakers are “captured by the mouse” when 
visualizing how to transfer the correct discs to the correct pegs, echoing the mouse movements 
in the gestures they produced.  Computer solvers, whose hands were formed around the 
mouse while solving the task, encoded control of the moved disk differently than the physical 
solvers whose hands physically grasped the discs.  
 Under the Information Packaging Hypothesis, images which are conceptualized 
differently should be indicated in different types of representational gestures.  In the present 
study, speakers may have found it easy to indicate objects, but may have found themselves 
temporarily uncertain when searching for the correct directional move in order to solve the 
problem.  These findings build upon the Information Packaging Hypothesis by showing that 
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speakers produce format-specific gestures that call upon recent experience, particularly for 
indicating directional information.  The recent experience reflected in these speakers’ gestures 
may be the mind’s way of unlocking a way to conceptualize information in a different format.  If 
this is true, then perhaps higher conceptual demand might also lead speakers to prefer thinking 
in recent formats rather than in formats which reflect knowledge that is relevant, but not tied 
to recent experience.  Conceptualizing information in different formats should be reflected in 
the different representational gestures produced by speakers if they are speaking about the 
same thing.  To test this hypothesis, we turn to Experiment 2. 
 
Experiment 2:  Explaining Analogs 
 Experiment 2 was designed to explore the role of representational gestures in explaining 
analogs rather than different formats of the same problem.  In analogs, imports may be 
expected based on the requirements of the analog format, but they may also bring carryover 
from having solved the physical model of the Tower of Hanoi.  For this experiment, I chose to 
use a Russian Dolls analog: 
A New York antiques dealer has made arrangements to have a set of three very 
expensive and fragile antique Russian dolls delivered to Vladimir in Moscow.  The 
dolls will all travel by mail.  To minimize the risk of loss, only one doll may be 
mailed at a time.   The dolls are all currently nested in New York City and will be 
available for shipping in the order largest to smallest. Also, because of a 
superstition, only a larger doll can ever be sent to a location where there is 
already another doll, so that the larger doll can “protect” the smaller doll.  
Vladimir, who is known to be temperamental, has warned that if this rule is not 
followed the deal will fall through. To meet these requirements, the London 
Office of the Antiques dealer will act as a go between. I am going to ask you to 
describe all of the steps that will be needed for all of the dolls to eventually 
make it to Moscow. 
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This particular analog was chosen over the Chinese Tea Ceremony for several reasons.  The 
problem space is different from that of the Tower of Hanoi in terms of the objects and 
locations, but was not as abstract as the Chinese Tea Ceremony.  The different “objects” of the 
Russian Dolls analog (dolls as opposed to discs) may influence the types of produced 
representational gestures.  Specifically, participants may be able to import “doll-holding” 
gestures over “disc-grasping” gestures.  
 The second purpose of this experiment was to test the effects of conceptual demand on 
representational gestures. Half of the participants solved the Tower of Hanoi in its standard 
setup, where smaller discs were on top of larger.  Keep in mind that solving this Russian Dolls 
analog involves mentally reversing the traditional Tower of Hanoi, in that larger dolls must be 
around smaller dolls.  Consequently, participants who had only experienced the standard Tower 
of Hanoi setup were in an incongruent condition relative to the Russian Dolls analog.  
Participants who solved the Tower of Hanoi in the reversed form did not need to carry out 
mental reversal.  Because their Tower of Hanoi experience directly mapped onto the target 
analog, these participants were in a congruent condition. I tested the imagistic utility of 
representational gestures by increasing conceptual demand in the participants who needed to 
reverse the mental image of the puzzle to solve the analog—that these gestures were linked to 
underlying mental structures and were not mere handwaving. 
 In order to examine the effects of gesture availability, the participants were further 
divided into two groups, with half being free to gesture and half not allowed to gesture.  I 
predicted that representational gestures would aid speakers in translating the base problem 
into the Russian Dolls format, especially in the more difficult incongruent condition, and 
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conversely, restricting gesture would have a greater cost to fluency in the same condition.  If 
these predictions are supported, I will conclude that representational gestures are engaged at 
the conceptual or message level of speech planning and can be carried forward or adapted to 
different formats.  
Participants 
 Participants were Lehigh University undergraduates (n = 24) enrolled in an introductory 
psychology course.  They participated to receive direct experience of the research process.  All 
participants were fluent in English and reported no recent experience with the Tower of Hanoi. 
Design 
 Participants were placed into four 
groups:  congruent/gesture permitted, 
congruent/gesture precluded, 
incongruent/gesture permitted, and 
incongruent/gesture precluded.  Participants 
first solved the Tower of Hanoi in its standard 
form or in a form that was already reversed.  
Because the reversed form directly mapped onto the analogy, it was a considered to be in the 
congruent form.  On the other hand, solving the Tower of Hanoi in standard form called for 
mental inversion to conceptualize the analog.  This version of the Tower of Hanoi was thus 
considered to be in incongruent form.  
 After solving the Tower of Hanoi in one of these two formats, participants were 
presented the Russian Dolls analog and were asked to think-out-loud through it.  They were 
Fig. 5a:  Experiment 2 design 
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Fig. 5b: visual aid accompanying 
oral presentation of the analog 
either permitted to gesture or precluded from gesturing during their explanation.  Thus, the 
experiment used a 2 Congruency (congruent, incongruent) by 2 Gesture (permitted, precluded) 
between-groups design (refer to Figure 5a).   
Materials 
 Participants solved a physical version of the Tower of Hanoi which consisted of three 
wooden pegs and three wooden discs, presented in either reverse (congruent) or normal 
(incongruent) form.  Also, as visual aids for instruction on the analog, a set of three Russian 
dolls was set up on a sheet of paper on which three city names, New York, London, and 
Moscow, were printed horizontally (see Fig. 
5b).  
Procedure  
 Each participant was lead to a room 
where a physical model of the Tower of Hanoi 
was covered by a paper bag.  In every 
condition the experimenter uncovered the 
model  
and explained to the participant that he or she would be solving a common puzzle where all 
three discs must be transferred from the first peg on the left, to the third peg on the right.  In 
the incongruent condition, in which participants solved the Tower of Hanoi in its normal form 
and would have to reverse the puzzle to solve the analog, the experimenter provided two rules:  
that only one disc could be moved at a time and that a smaller disc could only be placed on top 
of a larger disc.  In the congruent condition, where participants solved the Tower of Hanoi 
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reversed and could directly map onto the analogy, the experimenter modified the second rule 
so that a larger disc could only be placed on top of a smaller disc.  To encourage participants to 
solve it optimally in as few tries as possible, the experimenter provided the hint that the top 
disc must first be moved to the rightmost peg.  Once participants indicated that they 
understood the rules and hint, they proceeded to solve their respective versions of the puzzle.  
If the participant did not solve the puzzle in seven steps the first time, the experimenter 
explained to them that it could be solved in a fewer number of steps and had the participant 
repeat the task until they solved it optimally once.  Participants were videotaped as they solved 
the puzzle.  After they solved the puzzle, the experimenter covered the model so that it would 
not visually aid the participant during his or her explanation.   
 After solving the base problem, the experimenter informed the participants that she 
was testing how well the task had prepared them for solving an analog of the Tower of Hanoi.  
The experimenter also explained that the analog was essentially the same problem but stated 
in a different way.  The experimenter read the Russian Dolls analog to the participant and asked 
them to understand how it related to the Tower of Hanoi version.  While the experimenter 
orally presented the analog, the participant was able to look at a set of Russian dolls in order to 
see how their containment order was related to the stacking of discs in the Tower of Hanoi.  
Also, the participant could reference the sheet with the New York, London, and Moscow labels 
to get a sense of how to visualize them as the three pegs.  Following the oral reading of the 
analogy, the experimenter informed the participant that he or she could think of the places as 
the pegs and the different sized dolls as the discs.  In the incongruent condition, the 
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experimenter added that the analogy differed in the sense that the sizes were reversed—that 
the smallest doll must be “beneath the larger dolls.” 
 After the participant indicated that he or she understood the analogy, the experimenter 
asked him or her to imagine that he or she must explain to someone else how to solve the 
analog task for the first time, that he or she would think through the problem out loud and 
explain as though to someone in another room how to do it.  The participant was also asked to 
imagine that this person would have a model of the Tower of Hanoi in front of her and would 
learn to do it by moving the discs in the same order as she would send the doll.  Furthermore, 
the participant was asked to be specific as to which doll she was sending and the city it was 
being sent to, so that the person could easily follow along at each step. 
 If gesture was to be prohibited, the experimenter added to the instructions that she 
wanted the participant to keep his or her body as still as possible during the explanation so that 
he or she would be able to focus on the explanation better.  The experimenter asked the 
participant to sit on his or her hands.  This was done so that participants would not 
spontaneously begin to gesture if their hands were unrestricted.  Furthermore, I decided that 
this would be the most “natural” way of suppressing gesture, as many people sit on their hands 
in informal conversation while speaking from a chair.  Participants, after indicating that they 
understood the instructions, explained how to solve the analog to the video camera that was 
operated by the experimenter.  If the participant gave errors in their explanation that 
prevented them from continuing, or produced a complete production with errors, he or she 
was permitted to restart his or her explanation up to two more times.  Upon finishing, the 
experimenter asked if they had any previous experience working with the Tower of Hanoi, and 
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participants’ answers were recorded on the video camera.  Lastly, the camera was turned off 
and participants were debriefed and thanked. 
Results 
Coding of Time and Efficiency 
 In order to test whether conceptual demand was increased by having to mentally 
reverse the Tower of Hanoi, all files were coded for how long it took for participants to 
completely talk through the Russian Dolls analogy.  First, I coded the number of restarts 
participants needed before producing a correct trial.  A restart was coded each time a 
participant completely restarted his or her explanation.  Total time was considered as the time 
it took to completely explain the analogy correctly.  In other words, the time of each restart and 
the time of the correct trial were summed to assess how long it took participants to complete 
their explanations.  Finally, the time of the best complete production was recorded.  It is 
important to note that in the incongruent/gesture precluded condition, many participants 
never gave a completely correct production, even after two restarts.  Thus, their first correct 
productions were treated as their best complete productions, which for most participants, 
were nearly always the last ones (with the fewest number of accuracy errors). 
Coding of Embodied Gestures 
 Representational gestures were divided into two main categories:  holding and grasping.  
Holding gestures were produced as though participants were physically holding Russian dolls 
with two hands, indicating their knowledge of what it feels like to handle this type of object.  
Thus, holding gestures were a type of import effect, appropriate to Russian dolls and often used 
despite the recent experience of handling the discs of the physical Tower of Hanoi.  Holding 
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gestures were classified as static or directional by the same criteria as in Experiment 1.  Static 
and directional grasping gestures were also coded by Experiment 1 criteria.  Hands moving 
directionally while accompanying spatial information conveyed in speech, but without holding 
or grasping, were coded as non-specific directional gestures.  Gesture repetitions were coded 
as gestures which repeated when speech phrases repeated.  These gestures were also specified 
as holding, grasping, or non-specific.  Finally, non-representational, beat gestures used 
alongside extraneous speech were coded as “other.”  Because I was not specifically coding for 
speech that indicated current states (i.e., so now you have two dolls in London, etc), these 
gestures were tallied but not considered relevant for the current analysis. 
   All gestures were coded as either fluency or dysfluency gestures.  Dysfluency gestures 
either lined up with or immediately followed speech dysfluencies, while fluency gestures were 
produced in conjunction with fluent speech. 
Coding of Speech 
 Speech dysfluencies were coded to indicate speakers’ difficulties with the explanations.  
Silent pauses of one second or longer were coded as hesitations.  Expressions that did not add 
new steps to the solution (i.e., um, like, well, uh) were coded as interjections/filled pauses.  
Changes in the speaker’s choice of dolls (i.e., then you take the largest…the smallest doll…) 
were coded as size revisions.  Similarly, changes in the speaker’s choice of destination (i.e., and 
move it to London…Moscow) were coded as destination revisions.  Phrase repetitions were 
coded for repetitions of at least two complete words of the message. 
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Conceptual Demand 
 To determine whether congruency and gesture preclusion increased conceptual 
demand, I analyzed the time of participants’ best complete productions.  Mean times are 
presented in Fig. 6a.  Though a 2x2 between-subjects ANOVA with factors of congruency and 
gesture revealed no significant effects or interaction (F(1,23 < 1), the data do pattern as 
predicted with longer times in the incongruent and gesture precluded conditions.   
    
    Fig. 6a:  Mean length of speakers’ best complete production  
These trend patterns also held for participants’ number of needed attempts.  Mean attempts 
are presented in Figure 6b.  Though a 2x2 between-subjects ANOVA with factors of congruency 
and gesture revealed no significant interaction (F(1,23)=1.42, p=0.26, ns), the data also pattern 
as predicted, with longer times in the incongruent and gesture precluded conditions.  There 
were main effects of congruency (F(1,11)=13.02, p < 0.001) and gesture preclusion 
(F(1,11)=22.25, p < 0.001).  We can conclude that these manipulations increased difficulty in 
explaining how to solve the analog, but they are independent of one another. 
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Fig 6b:  Mean additional attempts needed before best complete production 
Dysfluencies 
 Total dysfluencies were compared across congruency conditions.  Overall dysfluency was 
assessed by summing the number of hesitations, interjections (filled pauses), revised errors, 
unrevised errors, and phrase repetitions.  Results are presented in Figure 7a.  Effects of 
congruency and gesture preclusion are evident, but these effects were independent of one 
another.  There were far more dysfluencies in the incongruent conditions and the rate of 
dysfluency was doubled in both levels of congruency when gesture was precluded.  Participants 
benefited by having access to gesture, despite incongruent mapping. 
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 Fig. 7a:  Dysfluency as a function of congruency and gesture preclusion 
Gesture Preferences 
 To make an initial assessment of gestures, they were first divided into representational 
(including holds and grasps) and nonrepresentational and further classified by their alignment 
with fluent vs. dysfluent speech in both congruent and incongruent conditions.  Total 
representational gesture counts were obtained by summing all static and directional grasps and 
holds, while non-representational totals were obtained by summing all non-specific and 
“other” gestures.  Results are presented in Figures 7b and 7c.  In both congruent and 
incongruent conditions, representational gestures overwhelmingly accompanied fluent speech.  
Chi-square analyses show that the concentration of representational gestures in the fluent 
conditions is significant in both the congruent (X-square (1) =12.72, p <0.001) and incongruent 
(X- square (1) = 5.215, p<0.05) conditions.  These outcomes suggest that representational 
gestures accompanied successful steps in the solution description. 
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 The most revealing analyses turned out to involve the distribution of different kinds of 
representational gestures.  Specifically, there were systematic patterns in the distribution of 
holds versus grasps, and these varied with conceptual demand. Figure 8a shows a striking 
association of holding gestures (referencing dolls) with the congruent problem format and of 
grasping gestures (referencing disks) with the more difficult incongruent problem mapping.  A 
chi-square analysis confirms that this patterning is highly significant, X-square (1)  = 28.28, p < 
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0.001.  Participants whose Tower of Hanoi experience directly mapped onto the target analog 
produced holds almost exclusively.  However, participants who needed to mentally reverse 
their Tower of Hanoi experience produced considerably more grasps than holds.  One way to 
interpret this is that these participants were often forced back to the original disc context to 
sort out the mapping of dolls to discs, and so their gestures reflected disc-appropriate grasping.  
In the congruent condition, participants already had the experience of seeing and working with 
the already-inverted Tower of Hanoi.  Their mental representation of this form of the puzzle 
may have already been encoded.  As a result, they may have been able to embellish this 
“baseline” mental representation with features of the dolls they were speaking about in their 
solution description.  Such details may have been incorporated into their conceptualization 
and, consequently, in their representational gestures. 
 
Fig 8a:  Static representational gesture preferences 
These patterns also held when static and directional gestures were separated.  Results are 
presented in Figure 8a,b. The separate Chi-squares were both significant (X-square (1) = 13.67, 
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p<0.001, X-square (1) = 14.80, p<0.001, respectively).  Static and directional holds were 
dominant with congruent mapping, but static and directional grasps dominated with 
incongruent mapping.  For the most part, grasps and holds were maintained from gesture 
initiation through directional gestures. 
 
Fig. 8b:  Directional representational gesture preferences  
Experiment 2 Discussion 
 The main purpose of the above analyses was to determine whether representational 
gestures have cognitive utility by facilitating solutions to novel, conceptual problems.  Because 
representational gestures reflect conceptual demands (Hostetter et al., 2007), I hypothesized 
that precluded gesture would make solving a novel problem with high conceptual demand 
more costly than if the novel problem had low conceptual demand.  The first analyses provided 
partial support for this hypothesis.  An analysis of time of best production patterned as 
expected but did not yield statistically significant effects. An analysis of number of attempts 
needed to successfully explain the problem was more sensitive.  There were separate effects of 
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gesture preclusion and congruency of base problem format, but these effects were not 
statistically interdependent.  Merely thinking about the problem in a conceptually different 
format (congruent conditions) was not particularly difficult, but thinking about a problem in a 
conceptually difficult format (incongruent conditions) was quite challenging.  Precluding 
gesture added to the relative difficulty of the speakers’ task at both levels of congruence.   
 Similar patterns emerged in the analysis of speech dysfluencies.  There was a relative 
benefit to fluency in permitting gesture in both congruent and incongruent-mapping 
conditions. Allowing gesture with incongruent mapping caused speakers to be about as fluent 
as those who solved the analog with congruent mapping.  Again, however, we cannot conclude 
that fluency was differentially impaired with high conceptual demand.    
 My hypothesis was also contingent on the idea that representational, but not beat 
gestures are critical for conceptualization.  Representational gestures overwhelmingly 
accompanied fluent speech while if any gestures accompanied dysfluent speech they were non-
representational.  These results, however, are inconclusive as to whether representational 
gestures necessarily relieve speech dysfluencies because participants did not seem to utilize 
them during the dysfluent episodes.  Thus, the non-representational gestures which 
accompanied dysfluent speech may have been nothing more than a reflection of dysfluent 
thinking.  However, an alternative view is that representational gestures did not relieve, but 
prevented dysfluencies as they were produced alongside fluent speech.  Gestures temporally 
overlap with semantically co-expressive words (McNeill, 1992), but onsets of gestural 
movements typically are produced before the onset of the related speech.  The differences in 
onset times can range from less than one to up to a few seconds (Morrell-Samuels & Krauss, 
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1992).  It may be that the produced representational gestures preceded the speech they 
accompanied, and that planning these gestures may be enough to organize such conceptual 
information into verbalizable groupings as claimed by the Information Packaging Hypothesis.  
Further analysis of the timing of the onset of representational gestures relative to the onset of 
speech may help clarify this issue. 
 One of the most revealing outcomes of Experiment 2 is that representational gestures 
were quite different in the congruent and incongruent conditions.  Holding gestures were 
imported in congruent-mapping situations, while grasping gestures were carried forward into 
incongruent-mapping situations.  These format-specific gestures appear to reflect differences in 
how speakers conceptualized the problems.  When conceptual demand was low, participants 
conceptualized the problem more generally, using their outside knowledge of Russian dolls to 
visualize and retrieve solution-relevant details.  When conceptual demand was higher, 
participants were more likely to conceptualize the analogy through their most recent 
experience by visualizing a concrete model of the Tower of Hanoi.  One explanation which may 
account for this is that being conscious of the difficult mental reversal imposed a more specific 
type of cognitive demand.  Speakers may have needed to refer to the concrete format of the 
physical Tower of Hanoi in order to sort out their next moves.  On the other hand, speakers 
who had the benefit of congruent mapping may have found it easier to transfer to the new 
format, as shown by the importing of holding gestures.  This finding seems to be consistent 
with the findings of Experiment 1 by supporting the likelihood that speakers will gesture in line 
with the more recent format, provided that the two formats are congruent.  In Experiment 1, 
all of the transfers to different formats involved congruent mapping, i.e. the two formats were 
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different but similar in conceptual difficulty.  This may account for why grasping gestures—
which reflected the physical experience—did not carry forward to the computerized format, as 
predicted.  If, however, participants needed to explain an incongruent computerized version, 
we could see a carryover effect similar to that observed in the incongruent condition of 
Experiment 2.  Future studies may want to explore this possibility as it may speak for the 
cognitive utility of format-specific gestures when strategizing in different formats. 
General Discussion 
 The main question of interest in the present study was whether representational 
gestures aid conceptualization by transferring across problem formats.  To address this 
question, I developed two tasks that elicited similar utterances, but differed in how speakers 
were expected to think about the problems.  Experiment 1 extended the findings of Wagner 
Cook and Tanenhaus (2009) by showing that embodied gestures can be imported to opposite 
formats.  Grasping gestures of physical-physical solvers carried forward while non-grasping 
gestures were imported to explain a computerized version of the Tower of Hanoi.  Following a 
computer experience, speakers were not format-specific in referring to selected objects but 
were format-specific for indicating direction of movement.  Experiment 2 tested whether 
representational gestures respond to conceptual demand by facilitating solutions to novel 
problems.  Speakers experienced a greater cost to fluency when gesture was precluded when 
thinking through a problem with higher conceptual demand.  Furthermore, speakers’ 
representational gestures varied in format, even though they all described the same analog.  
Because representational gestures accompanied fluent speech, the speech content was largely 
equivalent in this comparison. Holding gestures were imported to facilitate explanations in a 
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straightforward new format, but disk-appropriate grasping gestures were employed when the 
same problem was conceptually and spatially more complex.  These findings support the 
Information Packaging Hypothesis by demonstrating the association of representational 
gesture with conceptual planning rather than linguistic formulation.  They also extend previous 
research by specifying when problem solvers draw on recent experience rather than on general 
knowledge when asked to describe a problem in a different format. 
 Representational gestures are a way of breaking down a lengthy process into a discrete 
sequence of steps (Alibali et al., 2000).  The Tower of Hanoi is a good example of this type of 
task as speakers must solve the problem optimally in 7 steps, with each step contingent on a 
previous correct step.  The cognitive processes behind this task are dictated by its embodied 
nature.  Individuals will think about it differently depending on real-world interactions such as 
manipulating objects.  From this view, reproducing features of these interactions in gesture 
may be a way of accessing embodied spatial content in the perceptual-motor system (Schwartz 
& Black, 1999).  The utility of this is that the speaker may access solution-relevant details for 
explaining how to solve the problem.  By using representational gestures, solution-relevant 
details form strong mental representations in the visuospatial system that give solvers insight 
regarding the most appropriate way to conceptualize the problem.  The results of the present 
study stand in agreement with this view and extend it by indicating what types of 
conceptualization are reflected in format-specific gestures. 
 In Experiment 1, speakers articulated their movements not only using speech, but 
through specific motor plans.  Wagner Cook and Tanenhaus (2009) showed that speakers 
provide reliable perceptual-motor information in gesture when physical objects are not 
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available in the immediate environment.  This important finding accounts for why non-grasping 
gestures were produced following solving a computerized version of the Tower of Hanoi.  What 
speakers represented in gesture followed consistent patterns that reflected the mental 
representation of the task goal.  My findings not only demonstrate this specificity after 
experience with one task, but with the most recent task.  My findings indicate that when we 
are faced with new problems, we will immediately conceptualize them according to salient 
perceptual features of the problem’s particular format.  It is almost as though the human mind 
will instinctively immerse itself in the current format to be as efficient as possible in retrieving 
solution-relevant details.  These details, which reflect differences in conceptualization, are 
produced through representational gestures.   I propose, then, that conceptualizing the same 
task in a different domain involves a subsequent planning of format-specific gestures which 
reflect how task-relevant features are organized. 
 However, transferring formats does not always involve a change in conceptualization, as 
is demonstrated in Experiment 2.  Gesture carryover effects were evident when conceptual 
demand was high, indicating a preference to remain in the format of the previous task rather 
than to switch to a new one.  These findings agree with those of Hostetter et al. (2007), which 
assert that speakers produce embodied representations of conceptually difficult spatial images 
for the purposes of organization.  In the present study, higher conceptual demand involved re-
organizing a complex spatial task into smaller units, and speakers’ hands may have preferred to 
aid the speaker in visualizing concrete aspects of the Tower of Hanoi.  I propose that, in 
situations where there is a greater degree of re-organization, our hands must find a way to 
efficiently examine the new visuospatial details and how they relate within the sequence.  In 
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this case, it should be more efficient to first think about how the Tower of Hanoi looks in 
reversed form before visualizing three Russian dolls being shipped to Moscow.  Because the 
speakers in the congruent mapping condition already had the experience of solving the Tower 
of Hanoi in reversed form, they had already encoded the perceptual details of what the Tower 
looked like in reversed-form.  With this basic mental representation in place, speakers could 
embellish their conceptualization with more details, incorporating their general knowledge of 
Russian dolls to make the images more vivid.  On the other hand, speakers in the incongruent 
mapping condition had to mentally formulate the image of the reversed Tower of Hanoi 
without having any previous experience of it.  They needed to give themselves the experience 
of it mentally because they did not have access to it physically.  The resulting grasping gestures 
produced aspects of this concrete mental representation which provided the appropriate 
background for approaching the novel problem. 
 This proposal is consistent with Alibali et al. (1999) in that problem content must 
influence the resulting mental representation of that problem.  The findings of Experiment 2 
may be considered as involving gesture mismatches, where gesture and speech do not always 
convey the same information.  An example of this would be representing features of problems 
in gestures that do not employ the same strategies being described in speech, such as whether 
the hands move horizontally in a different direction than what is indicated in speech, as though 
the speaker may be briefly considering an alternative move.  Alibali et al. (1999) argue that 
content is one of many factors that might influence how a problem is represented.  I have 
extended this by showing that the conceptual demand of that content may be another factor 
which influences mismatches by showing that speakers prefer to represent concrete 
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experiences in gesture while speaking about a new problem.  These mismatches may be critical 
for giving insight for solving the more difficult version of the problem, and suppressing gesture 
would only restrict access to the mismatch.  These findings further the understanding of how 
people represent problems by showing that strategy choice depends not only on content, but 
on difficulty. 
 Taken together, the findings support the conclusions that representational gestures 
reflect the conceptual differences that arise between problem formats and aid speakers’ 
fluency in generating descriptions of complex problems.  These representational gestures offer 
valuable insight for understanding how people choose to visualize and construct specific 
problem-solving strategies.   Spatial thinking has an embodied nature which is enhanced by our 
actions in the world and how those actions build spatial representations in our minds.  The 
ability to conceptualize space is critical for planning speech, not necessarily at the linguistic 
formulation stage, but at the pre-linguistic message level where thoughts are organized before 
they are placed into words.  Thus, in accordance with Chu and Kita (2008), gestures that reflect 
non-linguistic material are perhaps linked with, but are not a part of, the speech production 
system (see Figure 1).  The representational gestures that accompany speech may be generated 
from a “growth point” in which images and linguistic categories inter-relate and evolve into 
gestures and utterances (McNeill, 1992).  Under this view, the results of the present study 
speak for representational gestures as a way to encode action information.  My results indicate 
that representational gestures systematically play a role in thinking about problems in different 
formats, a process that provides cognitive utility beyond maintaining the flow of speech.  
Representational gestures  47 
 
Specific features of this phenomenon not only provide insight about how we solve problems, 
but how we conceptualize different problem formats in our minds. 
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